Estate of Boyajian, Case Cite as G063155, Fourth District, Division Three, Filed on July 3, 2025.
Summary:
Revocation of a will by cancellation must occur by physical alteration of the will, and a separate, stand-alone document does not constitute a subsequent will unless it also transfers property upon death.
Decedent signed a two-page holographic will in 2006 that bequeathed her entire estate to her daughter, Anush. In 2018, the decedent signed a second document, prepared by her son, Robert, which purported to revoke all of the decedent’s prior estate planning documents. After the decedent’s death, the Anush petitioned to probate the 2006 will, which Robert contested. He contended that the decedent revoked the 2006 will by cancellation through the 2018 document. The trial court ruled in favor of Robert after a bench trial, reasoning that the decedent specifically intended the 2018 document to revoke the 2006 will, even though it did not otherwise dispose of property at death. Accordingly, the trial court found that the decedent died intestate. Anush appealed.
The appellate court reversed. Cancellation of a will requires a physical alteration to the will. Moreover, to constitute a subsequent will that revokes a prior will, a document must be testamentary in nature and dispose of property upon death. The 2018 document did not meet the Probate Code’s definition of an “instrument” because it did not reflect the decedent’s testamentary intent as it did not name a beneficiary, and did not transfer or dispose of any property upon the decedent’s death. Additionally, the document was notarized, and not witnessed by two persons, which is required for wills, and such witness formalities are required to turn a stand-alone revocation into a will.
Conservatorship of Anne S., Cite as B333052, Second District, Division Two, Filed on July 10, 2025
Summary:
Merely being a proposed conservatee’s neighbor is insufficient to qualify as an interested person or friend with standing to file a petition for conservatorship.
Attorneys Sobel and Hankin filed a petition to appoint Sobel as the conservator for the person and estate of Hankin’s neighbor, Anne. Although the petition was initially supported by Anne’s health care agent, medical professionals, and other individuals, Anne objected to the petition. After various developments, including a settlement agreement between Anne and her family members to resolve the conservatorship issues, Sobel withdrew from the petition. Still, Hankin maintained it on his own and objected to the settlement agreement because Anne lacked the capacity to execute a settlement agreement. Anne, through counsel, moved for judgment on the pleadings and sought sanctions, arguing that Hankin lacked standing to bring or maintain the petition under Probate Code §1820. The probate court agreed and granted both motions, finding Hankin had no legal standing and awarding $5,577 in sanctions against Hankin.
The appellate court affirmed both orders, holding that although Probate Code §1820 does authorize an “interested person or friend” to petition for conservatorship, Hankin’s fleeting association with Anne did not make him an interested person or friend. Standing is limited to individuals with a genuine connection to or legal interest in the proposed conservatee. Hankin’s petition was legally frivolous, justifying the award of sanctions. The orders were affirmed. Anne was held to be entitled to costs on appeal.